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Article 5

NOTES

case conflicts with outcome-determination, the current interpretation of
Erie v. Tompkins. A reconciliation of the conflict requires both a more
exacting definition of outcome-determination and a decision as to whether
it is an accurate interpretation of Eriev. Tompkins in the light of the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. If it is decided that outcome- determination should be retained, then certain adjustments to present place of trial
rules must be made. If a new interpretation evolves, allowing place of
trial to be freed from the states, it will make possible a more intelligent
and enlightened use of diversity jurisdiction.

FEDERAL VENUE AND THE CORPORATE PLAINTIFF

I
In federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction litigation three requirements must be met before adjudication on the merits is proper. The
parties to the litigation must be "citizens of different states,"' the federal
court where suit is initiated must have personal jurisdiction of the defendant and venue must be proper.' While the parties cannot, by consent, confer the diversity of citizenship jurisdictional requirement on a
court, both personal jurisdiction and proper venue are personal privileges
which the defendant can waive.3 Since these requirements have been
traditionally framed in concepts more easily applicable to natural persons
than to corporations, the corporate party in diversity litigation has presented unique jurisdiction and venue problems.
The contemporary corporate problem is presented by the general
1. U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2. Congress has often exercised its power to limit the
diversity jurisdiction powers expressed in the Constitution. The present limitation on
diversity jurisdiction requires that ". . . the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958). A further limitation has been placed on diversity jurisdiction litigation where a corporation
is a party to the litigation.

Congress has provided that ".

.

. a corporation shall be

deemed a citizen of any State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) (1958). For a more thorough discussion of the background of § 1332(c) see
1 BARRoN &HoLTZO FF, FEDERAL PRACTiCE AND PROCEDURE § 26, 142, n.93.1 (1960).
2. See BARRoN & HoLTzorr, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 26, 71, 172; 1 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 0.140 [1.-1], 1317 (2nd ed. 1960).
3.

motion:

".

.

. [T]he following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over

the person, (3) improper venue. .

made before pleading..

.

.

. A motion making . . . these defenses shall be

." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

"A party waives all defenses and

objections which he does not present . . . by motion . . . except (1) that the defense
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . [is not waived] . . .

and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
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corporate venue provision, section 1391 (c) of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code of 1948, which provides that:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such
corporation for venue purposes.4
It is obvious that standing alone the first clause of section 1391 (c), providing that "a corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which
,"
it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business .
would be limited to defendant corporations by the words nay be sued. It
was contended, however, that the second clause of section 1391 (c), providing that the three venue options of the first clause ". . . shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes," ' made
the three venue options the definition of corporate residence, equally applicable to plaintiff and defendant corporations and thus eliminated the
restriction of the words may be sued. While a number of district courts
have accepted this construction of the latent ambiguity of section 1391 (c)
and have allowed plaintiff corporations to lay venue in districts in which
they are licensed to do business or are doing business,' three district courts
have rejected the contention.' This plaintiff corporate venue contention
has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court, but there is a strong case
for a ruling that Section 1391 (c) establishes a new definition of plaintiff corporation residence, thus increasing its venue options.
II
While the section 1391 (c) plaintiff corporate venue problem is the
main area of contemporary difficulty, the earliest problem was a judicial
unwillingness to consider a corporation a citizen within the meaning of
the Constitution's jurisdictional provision.9 Only after more than fifty
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 164 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.C. 1958) aff'd 265
F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1959); Standard Ins. Co. v. Isbell, 143 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Tex.
1956) ; Eastern Motor Exp., Inc. v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1956);
Southern Paperboard Corp. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Ralston
Purina Co. v. United States, 1952 Am. Mar. Cas. 1496 (E.D. La. 1952); Hadden v.
Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., 105 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ohio 1952) ; Freiday v. Cowdin.
83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), appeal dismissed 177 F.2d 1020 (2nd Cir. 1949).
8. See Nebraska-Iowa Bridge Corp. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 796 (D. Neb.
1958); Albright & Friel, Inc. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1956);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 94 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ia. 1950), order vacated 95 F.
Supp. 469 (S.D. Ia. 1951).
9. See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809); Hope
Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 57 (1809).
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years of litigation did the Supreme Court decide that a corporation was
a citizen of its incorporating state, thereby giving it status as a legal
entity so that it could sue and be sued in its own right in the federal
courts.1" Having established that a corporation was a citizen of its incorporating state, the Bank of Augusta v. Earle' proposition, that a corporation ".

.

. must dwell in the place of its creation and cannot migrate

to another sovereignty,"" was extended to limit corporate venue to the
state of incorporation.'
The corporation, however, was not limited by
state boundaries in its economic activities, and, therefore, the corporate
venue limitation artificially and unsatisfactorily denied the corporation
its unique attribute of simultaneous multiple state operation.
In the late 19th century the effect of limited corporate venue was
lessened by Ex Parte Schollenberger4 in which the Supreme Court resorted to a doctrine of waiver. The Court held that a foreign corporation's compliance with a state statute, conditioning its privilege to do
business within the state on appointment of an agent to receive service of
process, constituted a waiver of the objection to improper venue." Although the Court emphasized that the corporation had actually "consented to be sued," the doctrine was short-lived. In dicta, in Southern
0 the Court
Pacific Co. v. Dentoe'
reasoned that the Ex Parte Schollenberger decision was grounded upon the venue provision in effect at the
time of that decision. That venue provision had allowed a defendant to
be sued in any district where he was found." The Court reasoned that
the corporation by appointing an agent to receive service of process had
not "consented to be sued," but merely had "consented to be found" outside of its state of incorporation, thereby coming under the venue provision rather than waiving an objection to venue which was improper
under the applicable provision.' The Court concluded that the elimina10. It was conclusively presumed that the stockholders were citizens of the cor-

poration's incorporating state, when in fact some stockholders were citizens of other
states. Louisville, Cinn. & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
The fiction made it no longer necessary for the stockholders to appear in the pleading as
the parties to the proceedings. See Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) ;
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896); Covington Drawbridge Co. v.
Shepherd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 227 (1857); Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 227 (1844).
11. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
12. Id. at 558.
13. See Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939).
14. 96 U.S. 369 (1877).
15. Id. at 378.
16. 146 U.S. 202, 207 (1892).
17. The venue provision allowed a defendant to be sued in the "...
district . . .
whereof he is an inhabitant or in which he shall be found ... " Judiciary Act of 1875,
18 Stat. 470 (1875).
18. Southern Pacific Co. v.Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 207 (1892).
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tion in the Judiciary Act of 1887,"9 as corrected by the Judiciary Act of
1888,"0 of the venue option that allowed a defendant to be sued where
found acted as a proviso to limit venue to incorporating states.
With three exceptions, 2 this dicta was followed by the lower federal
courts until 1939.

Then, in Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co. 2 2 the

Supreme Court held that a corporation complying with a state statute requiring appointment of an agent to receive service of process had "consented to be sued" in a federal court sitting within the state, thereby waiving its objection to improper venue. In reaching the decision the Court
emphasized that the change in the venue provision of the Judiciary Act
of 1887 as corrected by the Judiciary Act of 1888 was not pertinent to
the holding, since the question before the Court was one of waiver of objections to improper venue, rather than a question of corporate residence
under the applicable venue provision."3
Although the Neirbo waiver doctrine diminished the impact of limited corporate venue, it was in no way a complete solution to defendant
corporate venue problems. Since the waiver doctrine was based upon
actual consent by compliance with a state foreign corporation licensing
statute, a corporation that did not comply with the licensing statute by
appointing an agent to receive service of process would not be amenable
to suit in the federal courts within the state unless the plaintiffs were
residents of the state.
With only the Neirbo waiver doctrine disturbing the traditional holding that corporate venue was proper only in a corporation's state of incorporation,2 4 Congress expanded corporate venue in section 1391 (c) of
19.

24 Stat. 552 (1887).

The venue provision read ".

.

. where the jurisdiction is

founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall
be brought only in the district of either the plaintiff or the defendant."
20. 25 Stat. 434 (1888). The corrections to the Judiciary Act of 1887 are not
relevant to the diversity venue provision.
21. See Levin, Federal Venue in Actions Against Corporations, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 92,
97 (1940). One court held that the appointment of an agent to receive service of
process was consent to be sued in a court sitting within the boundaries of the state.
Shainwald v. Davids," 69 Fed. 704 (N.D. Cal. 1895). One court held that appointment of
an agent to receive service of process constituted consent to be an inhabitant of a nonincorporating state, and while a corporation could never be a citizen of the state, the
venue requirements were fulfilled. Patten 'v. Dodge Mfg. Co., 25 F.2d 852 (D. Ind.
1928), rev'd o= other grounds 60 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1932). One court held that a state
statute providing that a corporation must appoint an agent to receive service of process
in any action against the corporation went beyond the state statutes upon which the Supreme Court had previously spoken and included federal courts sitting within the state.
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 100 F.2d 770 (10th Cir. 1938).
22. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
23. Id. at 172.
24. See Suttle v. Reich Bros. Const. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948) ; In re Keasbey and
Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221 (1895); Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1892).
For a complete list of cases holding that a corporation's residence for venue purposes is
its incorporating state see Suttle v. Reich Bros. Coast. Co., mpra, at 166, n. 7.

NOTES
the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code of 1948. The Neirbo waiver
doctrine was enacted into section 1391 (c) by allowing corporations to
be sued where they are licensed to do business, and Congress eliminated
the effect of corporate non-compliance with a state's foreign corporation
licensing statute by making corporations amenable to suit in districts
where they are doing business. In addition to these two obvious results
Congress created the latent ambiguity of section 1391 (c) that makes the
section susceptible to an interpretation allowing plaintiff corporations to
sue where they are incorporated, licensed to do business or are doing
business.
III
Section 1391 (c) as a definition of plaintiff corporation residence
was first in issue in Freidayv. Cowdin.2" The plaintiff stockholder, over
the defendant's objection, successfully laid venue in a derivative stockholders action in New York, where his Delaware corporation was doing
business. With little authority,2 6 the court found a congressional intent
to deal comprehensively with venue provisions and based its decision on
two grounds. First, the court, assuming that section 1391 (c) at least
contained a definition of defendant corporation residence, stated that if
the definition was not applicable to a plaintiff corporation there would
be no definition of its residence in any other part of the 1948 Code revision." The second reason for the decision was based on the court's
feeling that a contrary result would have the inequitable effect of making
a corporation amenable to suit in a district in which it could not lay proper
venue as a plaintiff, unless all the defendants were residents of the district.2" While six other district court decisions have adopted the Freiday
multi-venue option position,2" only Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie &
Co."0 has offered additional support. The Haddem court reasoned that
Congress clearly indicated in the first clause of section 1391 (c) that the
multiple venue options applied only to defendant corporations, thereby
making the second clause of section 1391 (c) unnecessary unless Congress intended that the three venue options be a definition of corporate
25.

83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).

26. The Freiday case cites only two authorities for its position on § 1391(c) ; a
law review note that concludes that § 1391 (c) applies to plaintiff corporations, Note
60 HAv. L. Rav. 424, 435 (1947) ; and a statement that § 1391(c) ". . . changes the

. . . practice, under which a corporation was a resident of one district." 3 MooE, FDPACrcaC
§ 19.04, 2142 (2nd ed. 1948). It appears that Professor Moore did not
intend the latter statement to apply to plaintiff corporations. See 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 0.142 [5.-3]. at 1503.
27. Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
28. Ibid.
29. See cases cited note 7 supra.
30. 105 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
ERAL
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resident. It was further reasoned that as a definition section 1391(c)
must apply equally to plaintiff and defendant corporations, since a contrary result would make the second clause of section -391 (c) redundant.
The court then concluded that it must give effect to the definition, since
a court cannot overlook congressional language unless it is apparent that
it contains superfluous words or expressions."
The first case to reject the Freiday multi-venue option position was
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport.32 The defendant, a resident of Texas,
objected to the Wisconsin plaintiff corporation laying venue in Iowa,
where it was doing business. In sustaining the defendant's motion to
dismiss the court emphasized that in the past Congress had seemed satisfied with the limitation of corporate venue to the corporation's state of
incorporation. From this it was concluded that to make the drastic change
favored by the Freiday multi-venue option position there would have to
be a clear expression of such a congressional intention in the language or
legislative history of section 1391 (c)." Since the Davenport decision
four other district courts faced with corporate plaintiffs attempting to
lay venue outside their state of incorporation in districts in which they
were licensed to do business or were doing business have either adopted
the Davenport single venue option position3 4 or have held venue improper
on other grounds.3 5 In United Merchants & Mfrs. Co. v. United
States36 the plaintiff corporation brought an action outside its state of incorporation in a district in which it was licensed to do business to recover
a tax paid for documentary stamps. Venue was held improper on the
grounds that (1) section 1391 (c) could not be read in conjunction with
the special venue provision applicable to stamp tax recovery actions and
(2) the special venue read alone limited venue for corporate tax recovery
to the corporation's state of incorporation." The court, however, severe31. Id. at 531.
32. 94 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ia. 1950).
33. Id. at 85.
34. Nebraska-Iowa Bridge Corp. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 796 (D. Neb.
1958) ; Albright & Friel, Inc. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
35. United Transit Co. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 856 (M.D. Tenn. 1957);
United Merchants & Mfr., Inc. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1954).
These district courts held that § 1391(c) was only applicable to diversity jurisdiction
litigation and, therefore, could not be read in conjunction with a federal question venue
provision.
36. Supra note 35.
37. The special venue provision that the plaintiff was attempting to have read in
conjunction with § 1391 (c) provided that a corporate tax refund action could be brought
". .. only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides." Judicial Code and Judiciary Act of 1948 ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937 (1948). It was held that the language of the
special venue provision precluded the ".

.

. possibility that Congress intended that a

plaintiff could sue the United States in more than one district." United Merchants &
Mfr., Inc. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 435, 438 (M.D. Ga. 1954). See Albright &
Friel, Inc. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United Transit Co. v.
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ly criticized the Freiday multi-venue option position.

Since the Freiday

multi-venue option position was based on the argument that section
1391 (c) contains a new definition of corporate residence, it was argued
that as a necessary antecedent to a new definition of plaintiff corporate

residence it must be shown that section 1391 (c) contains at least a new
definition of defendant corporate residence.

The court implied that the

traditional definition of a corporation's residence as its state of incorporation was unchanged by section 1391(c). It then reasoned that by
allowing a corporation to be amenable to suit where it is licensed to do
business or is doing business, Congress created an exception to its general

rule that a diversity jurisdiction defendant is amenable to suit only in a
district in which all the plaintiffs or defendants reside.

The court con-

cluded that Congress recognized this exception and added the second
clause of section 1391 (c) to say that even though a corporation could be
sued in districts in which it did not reside, the districts should be treated
by courts as if they were the residence of the corporation."8 To supplement its main criticism of the Freiday multi-venue option position the
court also argued that if Congress intended to allow a corporation to sue

where it was incorporated, licensed to do business or was doing business,
it could have easily manifested the intention by having section 1391 (c)
read "a corporation nuy sue or be sued, etc."3
A stronger argument for the Davenport single venue option position
is advanced in Albright & Friel, Inc. v. United States" and elaborated in
Nebraska-Iowa Bridge Corp.v. United States.' The latter decision recogUnited States, 158 F. Supp. 856 (M.D. Tenn. 1957) ; contra, Southern Paperboard Corp.
v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Congress has amended the special
venue provision available to corporations in tax refund actions and allows a corporation to bring action in a judicial district ". . . in which is located the principal place
of business or principal office or agency of the corporation; or if it has no principal
place of business or principal office or agency in any judicial district (A) in the judicial
district in which is located the office to which was made the return of the tax in respect of which the claim is made. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2) (1958). For the
legislative history of the act, see U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws 5263 (1958). Although
the United Merchants & Mfr. holding has been superseded by Congress it seems that, if
§ 1391(c) creates a new definition of plaintiff corporate residence, the court violated
the rules of consistency in legislative drafting. The rules encourage a legislative draftsman to use the same words to refer to the same thing, and to change his words to refer
to different things. See PIESSE & SMITH, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 32
(2nd ed. 1958) ; DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING § 6.2(b), 62 (1954) ; 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 4970, 392 (Horack 3rd ed. 1943). But cf., Fourco Glass Co.
v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). The United Merchants & Mfr. holding
also violates the often suggested principle that legislatures should always draft statutes
in terms of the singular rather than the plural, for the singular will correctly encompass the plural. See DIcrERsoN, op. cit. supra § 6.9, at 67; 2 SUTHERLAND, Op. cit. supra
§ 4907, at 392.
38. United Merchants & Mfr., Inc. v. United States, supra note 37, at 438.
39. Ibid.
40. 142 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
41. 158 F. Supp. 796 (D. Neb. 1958).
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nized the anomalous result of the Davenport single venue option position,
which fails to treat plaintiff and defendant corporations equally. The
court stated, however, that it must look at the restrictive nature of the
word "such" modifying corporation in the second clause of section
1391 (c). The second clause provides that the three venue options of the
first clause of section 1391 (c) ". . . shall be regarded as the residence
of such corporation for venue purposes."4 2 The court concluded that as
a matter of syntax "such corporation" can refer only to the corporation
previously mentioned in section 1391 (c), that corporation being a defendant corporation because of the limitation of the words "may be sued"
in the first clause of section 1391 (c)."
Since conflicting methods of statutory construction account for the
opposing lines of authority regarding section 1391 (c), analysis of the
merits of these methods is relevant. As has been indicated, in United
Merch nts & Mfrs. Co. v. United States" it was contended that section
1391 (c) did not create a new definition of either plaintiff or defendant
corporate residence. It was implied that the definition of corporate residence was a corporation's state of incorporation. It seems, however, that
proper weight was not given to the word "as" in the second clause of
section 1391 (c), which designates that the three venue options ". . . shall
be regarded as the residence of such corporation.... "" In affect, to
reach the United Merchants & Mfrs. conclusion that section 1391 (c)
was not a definition of corporate resident, it was necessary to judicially
change the word "as" to like. Only then can a court destroy the fact that
"shall be regarded as" indicates an intention to create a definition. The
court also-made surplusage of the word "incorporated" in the venue options of the first phrase of section 1391 (c); for if the only definition
of corporate residence after section 1391 (c) is still an incorporating
state, to refer to the definition as like corporate residence is redundant.
Giving equal weiglht to all parts of section 1391 (c) it could be contended
that the section at least creates a new definition of defendant corporate
residence.
Accepting the conclusion that section 1391 (c) contains at least a
new definition of defendant corporate residence, the issue then becomes
the applicability of that definition to plaintiff corporations. The only
plausible ground for accepting the Davenport single venue option position is based on the use of the word "such" modifying corporation to
restrict the definition of the second clause of section 1391 (c) to a de42. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
43.

Nebraska-Iowa Bridge Corp. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D. Neb.

1958).
44. 123 F. Supp. 435, 438 (M.D. Ga. 1954).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).

NOTES
fendant corporation. While legislatures use such as a demonstrative adjective to refer to a previously identified person or thing, the facts that
this legislative device (1) is improper under general drafting standards"
and (2) has not been uniformly accepted in other English speaking jurisdictions, 7 weaken the argument that section 1391 (c) applies only to defendant corporations. While authority for refusing to use such as a demonstrative adjective is not strong, it can be used by a court to obtain
two desirable ends. First, the authority shows that the Freiday multivenue option position can be judicially obtained, and, second, it allows a
court to warn Congress that if an enactment is to be restricted in some
manner the restriction must be gramatically correct to eliminate guesswork in statutory construction.
Often, when the language of a congressional enactment is susceptible
to more than one interpretation, a court can correctly construe the provision by seeking a manifestation of congressional intent in the legislative
history of the enactment. In the legislative history of section 1391 (c),
however, it is apparent only that the section invoked no congressional debate.4" Even if section 1391(c) only expanded the definition of defendant corporate venue, this expansion is not necessarily a "minor
' or a "non-controversial
change"40
change.' ' "° Therefore, it would seem
that the congressional silence is inconclusive and there is no manifest intent that would prevent plaintiff corporations from laying proper venue
outside their states of incorporation in districts where they are licensed
to do business or are doing business. To reach a contrary conclusion a
court would have to attribute to Congress an illogical intent. In effect,
46. See, DIcKERsoN, op. cit. supra note 37 § 7.6, at 82.
47. See PIEssE & SmiTH, op. cit. supra note 37, at 52.
48. Professor Moore in testifying on venue said, "Venue provisions have not been
altered by the revision. Two changes of importance have, however, been made. Improper venue is no longer a grounds for dismissal . . . [a]nd Section 1404 . . . gives
the court power to transfer a case. . . ." Hearings before Subcommittee No. i of the
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 16oo and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1947).
In referring to venue it was stated ". . . minor changes were made in the provision

regulating the venue of district courts in order to clarify ambiguities or to reconcile
conflicts. These are reflected in the revisor's notes under sections 1391-1406." H.R.
REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., lst Sess. 6 (1948). The Reviser's Note on § 1391(c) reads:
In subsection (c), references to defendants "found" within a district or voluntarily appearing were omitted. The use of the word "found" made section 111
of title 28 U.S.C., 1940 ed., ambiguous. The argument that an action could be
brought in the district where one defendant resided and a non-resident defendant
was "found" was rejected in Camp v. Gress, 1919, 39 S. Ct. 478, 250 U.S. 308,
63 L. Ed. 997. However, this ambiguity will be obviated in the future by omission of such reference.
Reviser's Notes, following 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1958). On the floor of the Senate it was

said ". . . the purpose of this bill is primarily to revise and codify and to enact into
positive law, with such corrections as were deemed by the committee to be of substantial
and non-controversial nature." 94 CONG. REc. 7928 (remarks of Senator Donnell).
49. See note 48 supra.
50. Ibid.
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it would have to be held that Congress changed one half of the traditional
definition that limited plaintiff-defendant corporate residence to the corporation's state of incorporation and did not consider it necessary to
clarify plaintiff corporate residence at all in the Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure Code of 1948.
Since section 1391(c) is susceptible to diverse interpretations, it
seems proper for a court to look beyond the rules of statutory construction and consider the effects of the Freiday multi-venue option position
and the Davenport single venue option position. When consideration is
given to the effects of the contrary positions, it appears that there are
several factors which make the Freiday multi-venue option position the
most desirable interpretation of section 1391 (c)."
IV
Since the inception of diversity jurisdiction, Congress has, with one
exception in the late 1800's,52 considered it important to offer venue options that treat plaintiffs and defendants equally. Even in conception,
the purported reasons for establishing diversity jurisdiction, although
primarily concerned with natural persons, were based on equal plaintiffdefendant treatment 3 and may well afford the basis of the congressional
equal venue option policy. If the Freiday multi-venue option position is
rejected, a court will be destroying this continuous congressional policy.
The first venue provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed a de51. There has been a definite conflict as to the desirability of the Freiday multivenue option position on § 1391(c). For authorities supporting the Freiday multi-venue
option position see 1 BARRoN & HOLTZoFF, op. cit. supra note 1 § 80, at 388; Wechsler,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
216, 240, n. 126 (1948) ; Note, 60 HARV. L. REV. 424, 435 (1947) ; Note, Federal Venue
and the Corporate Plaintiff: Judicial Code Section 1391(c), 28 IND. L.J. 256 (1953) ;
contra, 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 0.142[5.-3], at 1503; MOORE, COMMENTARY ON
THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE § 0.03(28), 178 (1949); 1-A OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 279
(1950); Comment, The Corporate Plaintiff and Venue Under Section I391(c) of the
Judicial Code, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 112 (1960); 51 MiCH. L. REv. 440 (1953) ; 1 VILL. L.
REV. 355 (1956).
52. At one time it was possible to lay proper diversity jurisdiction venue in any
district in which the defendant could be found. See Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470
(1875).
53. Although there are no specific instances to support the contention, one purported reason for diversity jurisdiction was to prevent state courts from discriminating
against non-residents. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV.
L. REV. 483, 494 (1928). More persuasive reasons for establishing diversity jurisdiction
are presented by the hopes that: (1) the federal courts would protect non-resident creditors against the favorable debtor legislation in some states, (2) the widespread legislafive control of the appointment and tenure of judges would not be used to discriminate
against non-residents and (3) the unique situation that made Connecticut's legislature also its Supreme Court would not be used to discriminate against non-residents. Friendly,
supra at 496.
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fendant to be sued wherever he was found, 4 but by a jurisdictional limitation Congress effectively limited diversity venue to either the plaintiff's
or defendant's residence." The only deviation in this policy came about
in the Judiciary Act of 1875 when Congress removed the above jurisdicAllowing
tional limitation 8 and left the venue provision unchanged."
venue to be laid wherever the defendant could be found quickly proved
unsatisfactory, since it was considered inequitable to make a defendant
subject to suit anywhere he could be found. 8 Therefore, in the Judiciary
Act of 1887 as corrected by the Judiciary Act of 1888 a specific diversity
jurisdiction venue provision was enacted which reinstated venue in either
the plaintiff's or defendant's residence. 9 In commenting on the proposed
venue change Senator Hoar said that a plaintiff should initially be able
to lay proper venue in his own residence. The Senator reasoned that
otherwise a defendant who came into the plaintiff's district would be
amenable to suit only in the state court and have the only option to remove the cause to the federal courts.6" The equal venue option policy
continued and was incorporated into the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Code of 1948.61

If the Davenport single venue option position is accepted, a corporation, while being amenable to suit in districts where it is licensed to do
business or is doing business, will be unable as a plaintiff to lay proper
venue in those same districts, unless all the defendants are residents of
the district.62 Thus, the Davenport single venue option position destroys
the equal venue treatment previously afforded plaintiff and defendant
corporations. It can be argued that there is no equality of venue options
if a corporate plaintiff can sue a natural person outside its incorporating
54.

The venue provision allowed a defendant to be sued in a district ".

.

. whereof

he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of the serving of the
writ. . . ." Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79 (1789).
55. The provision allowed the federal courts to take jurisdiction when

"...

the

suit is between a citizen of the State where suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State." Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79 (1789).
56. 18 Stat. 470 (1875). The provision gave the federal courts jurisdiction of controversies ".

.

. between citizens of different states. ..

."

57. The venue provision allowed a defendant to be sued in the "district . . .
"
Judiciary Act of
whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found ...
1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
58. See Miller v. Eastern Oregon Gold Mining Co., 45 Fed. 345, 347 (C.C.D. Ore.

1891).
59.

The venue provision reads

"...

where the jurisdiction is founded only on the

fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be 'brought only in

the district of either the plaintiff or the defendant." Judiciary Act of 1887, 24 Stat.
552 (1887) as corrected by Judiciary Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 434 (1888).
60. 18 CoNG. REc. 2545 (1887) (remarks of Senator Hoar).
61. The general diversity jurisdiction venue provision provides that action may be
brought ". . . only in the judicial district where all plaintiff's or all defendant's reside." 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) (1958).
62. Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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state in districts where it is licensed to do business or is doing business,
since in all likelihood a corporation will be able to sue in a greater number
of districts than a natural plaintiff. This criticism of the Freiday multivenue option position, however, does not seem acceptable. The Freiday
multi-venue option position looks beyond the mere numerical inequality
of a natural person's and a corporation's venue options. It faces the
reality that there is a need to equate the plaintiff corporation with natural
plaintiffs and defendants and defendant corporations, by allowing venue
to be proper where a litigant's economic or other activity is probably
greatest; in the case of a natural plaintiff or defendant the district where
he lives, and in the case of a plaintiff or defendant corporation the district
or districts where it is licensed to do business or is doing business.
In interpreting venue provisions the federal courts recognize that
Congress designs venue provisions to fulfill certain objectives. While
the initial congressional restriction of diversity jurisdiction venue provisions was to eliminate the inconvenience to which a defendant might be
subjected if he was amenable to suit wherever he was found, " defendant
convenience has not been the sole objective in venue provisions. Considering the probable location of records, transportation costs, and other
related matters, plaintiff and witness conveniences have also been recogSince Congress
nized as objectives in formulating venue provisions."
recognizes plaintiff and witness conveniences as legitimate venue objectives it would seem that a court should construe the latent ambiguity of
section 1391 (c) to allow the maximum flexibility in plaintiff corporate
venue. State venue provisions that allow a plaintiff to sue where he is
doing business may be justifiably subject to criticism on the grounds that
this type of venue provision serves plaintiff convenience and disregards
defendant and witness convenience. 5 In diversity jurisdiction litigation,
however, not only will plaintiff convenience be served, but in many situations witness and possibly defendant convenience will be served by accepting the Freiday multi-venue option position.6 6
A further reason for accepting the Freiday multi-venue option posi63. See, Miller v. Eastern Oregon Gold Mining Co., 45 Fed. 345, 347 (C.C.D. Ore.

1891).

64. See Lesnick v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 977 (2nd Cir. 1944);
Cohen v. Commodity Credit Corp., 172 F. Supp. 803, 808 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Jacobson
v. Indianapolis Light & Power Co., 163 F. Supp. 219, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1958); Richard
v. Franklin County Distilling Co., 38 F. Supp. 513, 516 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
65. See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MIcH. L. RPv.

307, 313 (1951).

66. The Davenport case was instituted in Iowa, where the plaintiff corporation was
doing business, to have adjudication ". . . near the physical location of witnesses, whose

presence at the trial would be necessary to establish all the facts." Communication to
the INDIANA LAw JOURNAL from Mr. Frank Davis, attorney for the plaintiff, Chicago
& N.W. Ry.
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tion is to maintain the flexibility and usefulness of the change of venue
motion in section 1404(a) of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code
of 1948." r Under this change of venue provision district courts are given
the power to weigh the respective conveniences of the parties and the
witnesses and to transfer an action to a more convenient forum. This
district court power, however, has been severely limited by the Supreme
Court in Hoffman v. Blaski.5 The Court held that the only proper transferee districts on a change of venue motion were those in which a plaintiff could initially have made a valid service of process and laid proper
venue, independent of any desire on the part of the defendant to waive
objections to improper venue and personal jurisdiction. 9
The limitation on change of venue, in conjunction with the Davenport single-venue option position on section 1391 (c), would, in many instances, serve to make the most logical and convenient forum for adjudication an improper transferee forum. For example, in the Davenport
case there seemed to be, in addition to valid plaintiff conveniences, definite witness conveniences that would make the most convenient forum for
litigation the Iowa district in which the Wisconsin corporation was doing business." But, if the plaintiff corporation had initially laid venue
in another district and there was a motion by either party to transfer the
action to the Iowa district, a court accepting the Davenport single venue
option position would deny the motion. Under the Hoffman v. Blaski
change of venue position, venue would initially have been improper in
the Iowa district.
Often, if a defendant is a natural person or a corporation doing business only in its incorporating state, the conjunctive restriction of Hoffman v. Blaski and the Davenport single venue option position would make
it impossible to use the change of venue motion of section 1404(a). For
example, while a plaintiff corporation doing business outside its state of
incorporation could get a valid service of process against a natural person
uaider a state non-resident motorist statute, the Davenport single venue
option position would make venue improper in a forum where the corporation was only doing business. The only alternative for the corporation would be to sue in the defendant's residence, since the venue would
be proper 7 and a valid service of process could probably be obtained."
67.

"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a dis-

trict court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
68. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
69. The Court based its decision on the necessity to give content and meaning to
the words where it might have been brought. Id. at 344.
70. See note 66 supra.
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958).

72. See FD. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1).
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Once suit is brought in the defendant's residence, even though overwhelming convenience considerations may point to a transfer to the district in
which tle cause of action arose, a court, accepting the Davenport single
venue option position and bound to Hoffman v. Blaski, would be unable
to transfer the action to any other district. The court would be faced
with improper venue in the district in which the cause of action arose,
lack of personal jurisdiction in the corporation's incorporating state, and
both improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction in any other district in which the corporation was licensed to do business or was doing
business. This type of result, which makes the section 1404(a) change
of venue motion useless, not only illustrates a failure to consider valid
plaintiff and witness conveniences, but seems to support an invalid assumption that it is always most convenient for a defendant to be sued in
his residence. It is just as logical to assume that a defendant would desire litigation near the physical location of his witnesses, and if an accident occurred in another state it is unlikely that the defendant's witnesses
will be located at the defendant's residence.73
Hoffman v. Blaski has limited the usefulness of the section 1404(a)
change of venue motion in diversity jurisdiction litigation. If the flexibility of venue is further restricted by a rejection of the Freiday multivenue option position many cases will arise in which a court will have to
disregard all the litigant and witness convenience considerations.
A further reason for accepting the Freiday multi-venue option position can be based on the need to supplement, rather than restrict, the personal jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Since the district courts
can use state service of process provisions under Federal Rule 4(d) (7) ,"'
their personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants has been greatly
expanded as a result of (1) the Supreme Court's "enlightened rationale,""
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants doing acts within a state,"6 and (2) the increasingly comprehensive state non-resident jurisdictional provisions." While the expan73. See generally note 66 supra.
74. Any competent adult individual, domestic or foreign corporation, or partnership
or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name may
be served with a summons and complaint ". . . in the manner prescribed by the law of
the state in which the service is made for the service of summons or other like process
upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of
that state." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7) ; but cf. the accompanying note, Erie v. Tompkins
and Federal Determinants of Place of Trial.
75. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 672 (1953) (Separate opinion
of Burton, J.). See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957; but cf.
the accompanying note, A Reconsideration of "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction.
76. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 75, at 222.
77. E.g.,

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
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sion has been limited by requiring acts of non-residents within a state to
be of enough significance to make subsequent adjudication in the local
and federal district courts of the states equitable,"8 the expansion has
raised a federal venue issue which is relevant to the present controversy
over section 1391 (c).
The venue issue arose upon the contention that since the typical state
jurisdictional statute provided that a non-resident motorist negligently
causing an accident within the state appoints the Secretary of State as his
agent to receive service of process, the non-resident waived his right to
object to improper federal venue." This contention, however, was rejected in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R.8" in which a non-resident driving in Kentucky ran his vehicle into a railroad overpass and sufficiently
damaged the overpass to cause a subsequent train derailment. The Court
held that while the defendant could be subjected to the jurisdiction of
either the state or federal courts of Kentucky, the defendant by his acts
had neither actually or impliedly consented to be sued within the state
and, therefore, had not waived his federal venue rights. This result is
relevant to the present section 1391 (c) controversy, since it is now necessary for a plaintiff corporation using a non-resident jurisdiction statute
to show that it is a resident of the federal district in which it brings an
action. If the Freiday multi-venue option position is rejected, plaintiff
corporations will not be able to use non-resident jurisdictional statutes in
districts outside of their state of incorporation in which they are licensed
M

submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the
doing of any said acts: (a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State; (c) The ownership,
use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State; (d) Contracting to
insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of
contracting.
ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110 § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); see Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 262.05
(Supp. 1961) ; see generally the accompanying note, A Reconsideration of "Long-Arm"

Jurisdiction.
78. This result is obtained by the requirements of acts within a state and notice
sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. See
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294
U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d
740 (5th Cir. 1944); Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237
(1954) ; cert. denied 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
79. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953). The applicable statute
in the Olberding case was Ky. Riw. STAT. §§ 188.020-188.030 (1953). It had been held
that a statute similar to Kentucky's did not violate the fourteenth amendment. Hess v.
Pawloski, supra note 78. Non-resident motorists statutes generally (1) provide for implied appointment of a state official to receive service of process as the defendant's
agent, when the defendant is driving in the state, (2) provide for service of process by
registered mail and (3) require the defendant's return receipt before there is personal
jurisdiction of the defendant. See Ky. RFv. STAT. supra.
80. Supra note 79.
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to do business or are doing business. This result would, in effect, prohibit a plaintiff corporation's use of a legitimate means to bring an action in a logical and convenient federal court. In all likelihood the defendant's acts which give rise to non-resident jurisdiction will occur in
the districts in which plaintiff corporations carry on economic activitythe districts in which they are licensed to do business or are doing business-and not solely on their incorporating state.
Although the plaintiff railroad in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R.8"
was doing business in Kentucky, there was no claim that section 1391 (c)
made venue proper. The Court, however, indicated that it might be unreceptive to the Freiday multi-venue option when it said: "The requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those vague
principles which, in the interest of some overriding policy, is to be given
a 'liberal' construction." 2 There is no indication whether the Courts
was referring merely to general venue concepts or specifically to section
1391 (c), but if the reference was directed at section 1391(c) it is suggested that the Court's statement is unwise. Section 1391 (c) is not clear.
It is ambiguous and susceptible to diverse interpretations and should be
interpreted to supplement, rather than to limit, a method of service of
process that often places the litigants in the most convenient forum for
adjudication. Perhaps it would be best for Congress to enact a venue
provision which would make venue proper in a district "in which the
wrongful act, or part thereof occurred," 83 but since it has not it would
seem proper for a federal court faced with a legitimate venue ambiguity
to judicially reach that result. If there are defendant or witness conveniences that override adjudication in the forum in which the cause of
action arose, the section 1404(a) change of venue motion would seem
sufficient to protect the defendant's interests.8 4
Criticism has been leveled at the Freiday multi-venue option position
on the grounds that it will encourage plaintiff corporations to forum shop
in order (1) to seek favorable conflict of laws rules,"5 favorable state
statutes of limitation,86 and favorable state public policy,"2 and (2) to
81. 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
82. Id. at 340.
83. Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in Federal Courts, 7

VAND. L. REv. 608,
628 (1954). See generally Stevens, supra note 65, at 333.
84. For a discussion of the grounds for transfer under the change of venue motion
of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958) ; see 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.145 [5] (1960).
85. A federal court, in any diversity jurisdiction action, must apply to the conflict
of law rules of the state within which it is sitting. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
86. A federal court must, in any diversity jurisdiction action, apply the statute of
limitations of the state within which it is sitting. Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S.
630 (1940). A state's laches policy must also be applied by a federal court. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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harass the defendant by laying venue fax from his residence.88 The first
criticism, however, is invalid when the Hoffnwm v. Blaski change of
venue limitation and the Davenport single venue option position combine
to limit adjudication of a diversity jurisdiction action to the defendant's
residence, and the cause of action arose in another district. It is just as
likely that by restriction in choice of forums a defendant's own state
would have conflict of laws rules, statutes of limitation, and public policy
which would be more favorable to the plaintiff than the state law which
would apply in the forum where the cause of*action arose. This criticism,
therefore, seems to be one that should be aimed at diversity jurisdiction
in general, 9 rather than at the Freiday multi-venue option position. The
possibility of favoring one litigant over the other is a result of the district
courts being bound to apply the law of the state within which they are
sitting and not a result of restrictive or liberal venue provision. If, however, a plaintiff corporation attempts to forum shop, either to harass the
defendant or to seek favorable state law, the defendant would seem adequately protected since (1) the plaintiff must have a valid service of
process on the defendant in any forum where suit is brought 0 and (2) the
plaintiff will be subjected to added expense in litigation and delay in
judgment if the defendant seeks a change of venue under section
1404(a)."
V
The Freiday multi-venue option position is a unique solution to the
difficulty created by the 19th century corporate venue choice that limited
corporate residence to a corporation's state of incorporation. A court
that rejects that position would seem to be overlooking the change that
87. A federal court must, in any diversity jurisdiction action, apply the public
policy of the state within which it is sitting. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
88. These two crticisms were presented in Comment, The Corporate Plaintiff and

Venw Under Section i391(c) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. CHI. L.R. 112, 120 (1960). A
third criticism was leveled at § 1391(c) on the grounds that it would cause plaintiff
corporations to seek districts in which juries are reputed to give large recoveries. Ibid.
However, since large jury awards have not been considered as grounds for a change of
venue, the criticism appears to have no merit as applied to the Freday multi-venue option position on § 1391(c). See Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Igol, 280 F.2d 110 (8th Cir.);
cert. denied 350 U.S. 822 (1955).
89. The laws of a state must be applied by federal courts in diversity jurisdiction
litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). The application of state law in diversity jurisdiction has been extended to include the common and equity law of a state. See Erie Ry.
v. Tompldns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202

(1938).

90. A defendant can object to adjudication on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
over the person, insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process. FED. R.

Civ. P. 12 (b).

91. See, 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
(1960) ; Barrett, supra note 83, at 617.

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 80, 388
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has taken place in the relationship of the corporation and its state of incorporation. Today many corporations do not engage in any economic
activity within their state of incorporation and the state serves only as a
depository for incorporation papers and as a franchise tax recipient. The
Freiday multi-venue option position diminishes the effect of this contemporary corporate situation and affords the plaintiff corporation venue
options based on contemporary economic activity, not 19th century economic activity. It would seem that inherent in the Freiday multi-venue
option position is the realistic recognition that corporate residence is not
subject to the physical limitations that restrict the natural plaintiff's or
defendant's venue residence to a single forum. In addition to affording
contemporary plaintiff corporations realistic venue choices, the Freiday
multi-venue option position accomplishes at least two other desirable ends.
First, it allows a corporation federal use of non-resident jurisdiction
statutes outside its state of incorporation in districts in which it is engaging in economic activity and such a statute is most likely to be useful.
Second, it affords a district court a better opportunity to make a meaningful application of the recently restricted section 1404(a) change of
venue motion, because by numerically increasing the number of plaintiff
corporate venue choices it is likely that the number of proper transferee
forums will also be increased. If Congress did not intend for corporations to be able to lay proper venue in districts in which they are incorporated, licensed to do business or are doing business, it can clarify its
intent by statutory amendment.

PLANT REMOVAL AND THE SURVIVAL OF SENIORITY RIGHTS:
THE GLIDDEN CASE
The legal status of seniority rights earned under an expired collective bargaining agreement is in need of re-examination in light of the recent case of Zdanok v. Glidden.' The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that seniority rights earned under a collective bargaining
agreement which provides for priority of recall on the basis of seniority
in the event of a layoff, but which fails to provide for the disposition of
these rights upon the termination of the agreement, are "vested" rights
which survive the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Seni1. 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 814 (1962). The petition for
writ of certiorari was granted only on the question, "Does participation by a Court of
Claims judge vitiate the judgment of the Court of Appeals?" In all other respects the
petition for writ of certiorari was denied. 368 U.S. at 814.

